The foundation of the ORA system is that the batter is responsible for the average outcome of his batting event, if it comes to pass. If the outcome is exceeded, the runner who made the out or scored the run gets the blame or credit for the excess. Interpreting this principle in a logical and coherent manner is where it can get tricky.
In 2022, when the batter hit a groundball that wasn't a base hit or a sac bunt with runners on 1st and 2nd and one out, the batter was out 63% of the time, the runner on 1st was out 69% of the time, and the runner on 2nd was out just 7% of the time. So by my old system, if the runner on 2nd is forced out, the batter is only charged 7% of that out, which means the runner is on the hook for the other 93%, even though that out has almost nothing to do with the runner's baserunning ability and everything to do with the batter hitting a sharp grounder to the 3rd baseman who was playing near the bag. If the batter grounds into a 5-4 double play, he gets charged just 0.76 outs (0.07 for the runner on 2nd and 0.69 for the runner on 1st), less than the 0.93 the runner on 2nd gets charged for being forced out. Similarly, the runner on 1st has a very low out percentage on pop-ups, which means he has to eat almost all of his out if an infielder lets the ball drop and forces him at 2nd.
To solve for this, I'm adding a provision to my system. It's called "first force." Normally, the batter's share of each out is equal to the percentage of times the runner on that base was put out. But for the first runner forced out on a play (starting with the runner on 3rd and going around the horn), the batter's share is instead equal to the percentage of times that at least one out was recorded. For all other outs, including subsequent force outs on the same play, the batter's share is still equal to the out percentage of the runner on that base. First force never applies to the batter; his batting share of his own out is always equal to the batter's out percentage. And the runner is still responsible for the balance of his out, whether he was a first force or any other out, as before.
A groundball non-hit, non-sac bunt with runners on 1st and 2nd and one out happened 1,015 times in 2022. The runner on 2nd specifically was put out just 71 times - 7% of the time. But at least one out was recorded on the play (of any batter or runner) 960 times - 95% of the time. So if the runner on 2nd is forced out, the batter is responsible for 95% of that out; the runner is only responsible for 5% of it. If the first force is instead of the runner on 1st, then the batter is responsible for 95% of that out, and the runner is responsible for the other 5%. If the batter grounds into a 5-4 double play, he's charged 1.64 outs: .95 for the first force of the runner on 2nd and .69 for the putout of the runner on 1st (the batter's share is actually closer to 1.63 but I'm rounding decimals). .95 was the percentage of times at least one out was made on this type of play; .69 was the percentage of times the runner on 1st was put out. The runners are on the hook for the rest of their outs: .05 for the runner on 2nd and .31 for the runner on 1st.
Let's go through the first inning of the Astros/Angels game of April 7th, 2022 since it comprises the first eight or so rows of my event files spreadsheet.
ASTROS 1ST: Altuve was called out on strikes. Altuve earns .998 outs for the called third strike, because the batter was out 99.8% of the time he struck out with the bases empty and no outs. He earns the other .002 outs for actually being put out.
Brantley singled to left. No outs on the play.
Bregman forced Brantley (shortstop to second) [Bregman to first]. Bregman earns .96 outs for the first force of the runner, because at least one out was recorded 96% of the time the batter hit a groundball that wasn't a hit or a sac bunt with a runner on 1st and one out. Brantley earns the other .04 outs for being forced out.
Alvarez walked [Bregman to second]. No outs on the play.
Gurriel popped to first. Gurriel earns the full out for popping up, because the batter was out 100% of the time he hit a pop-up that wasn't a hit with runners on 1st and 2nd and two outs.
Here's a table of events for the top of the 1st. "OutsBat" is batting Outs, the shares of the outs the batter earned just by having the type of batting event that he did. "OutsBR" is baserunning Outs, what the runners (including the batter as a runner) earned for actually being put out.
ANGELS 1ST: Ohtani grounded out (shortstop to first). Ohtani earns .971 outs for the ground out, because the batter was out 97.1% of the time he hit a groundball that wasn't a hit with the bases empty and no outs. He earns the other .029 outs for actually being put out.
Trout walked. No outs on the play.
Rendon grounded into a double play (shortstop to second to first) [Trout out at second]. Rendon earns 1.96 total outs. He gets .96 for the first force on the runner, the same as Bregman earned for forcing Brantley in the same situation in the top of the 1st. He earns .653 for himself, because the batter was out 65.3% of the time he hit a groundball that wasn't a hit or a sac bunt with a runner on 1st and one out. (That's 1.614 batting outs combined for the two outs.) Rendon also gets the other .347 of his own out for being put out. Trout, meanwhile, earns just .04 of his out for getting forced.
And finally, let's go from Angels Opening Day 2022 to Reds Opening Day 2023 and revisit the scenario that's the subject of my very first post on this blog:
In the 1st inning, with no outs and the bases loaded, Tyler Stephenson grounded into a double play, forcing Jake Fraley at 2nd. Instead of 46% of Fraley's out (the percentage of times the runner on 1st was put out on this type of play in 2022) Stephenson now gets charged 93% of it (the percentage of times at least one out was recorded). Fraley only gets blamed for 7% of his out instead of 54% for getting forced at 2nd. Stephenson gets the blame for the other 1.93 of the two outs: .93 for the first force of Fraley, .45 for causing his own out, and .55 for the rest of his out for not beating the throw to 1st.
There were 129,226 outs in MLB in 2022. Transferring more of the responsibility for force outs to the batter means that 2,440 baserunning outs (mostly of the runner on 1st) are shifted over to the batters' ledger. The baserunning share of total outs drops from 7% to just over 5%.
Here are the players most effected by the change. Starling Marte gains about 11 Outs that were formerly distributed to his teammates, lowering his ORA from 5.97 (14th among qualified batters) to 5.77 (19th). Andrew Benintendi loses just about as many, which raises his ORA from 4.01 to 4.14.
Finally, here is the new Top 10 of 2022. "ORAv1" is what their ORA was with the old version of Outs. The only change in order is that Brandon Drury switched places with Kyle Tucker, Drury moving from 9th to 12th and Tucker from 12th to 9th.
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